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KEYNOTE TRANSCRIPT
"AMERICA THE VIRTUAL: SECURITY,
PRIVACY, AND INTEROPERABILITY IN AN
INTERCONNECTED WORLD"
LEAP-AHEAD PRIVACY AS A GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
IVAN K. FONG* & DAVID G.DELANEY"

Thank you for your invitation to speak at today's symposium, whose
theme, "America the Virtual: Security, Privacy, and Interoperability
in an Interconnected World," is without a doubt both timely and
important. The issues you are discussing and debating here are
central, not only to industry, government, and the academic
community in general, but also to the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS" or "Department") in particular. One of the
Department's five core missions, after all, is to safeguard and secure
cyberspace. And it is no exaggeration to say that "[o]ur daily life,
economic vitality, and national security depend on a safe, secure, and
resilient cyberspace." 1
* Although Mr. Fong delivered these remarks after his departure from his
position as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in
October 2012, they were prepared by Mr. Fong in his official capacity during his
tenure with DHS and thus represent views consistent with those of the
Administration.
** Deputy Associate General Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
The authors wish to thank Bruce McConnell, Matthew Angelo, and Lynn Parker for
their substantial assistance with these remarks.
1. Understandingthe Homeland Threat Landscape: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 16 (2012) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec.), availableat http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland
.house.gov/files/Testimony-Napolitano-0.pdf.
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It is also no exaggeration to state that our nation faces significant
and increasing cyberthreats from a range of individual, organized,
and state actors. Recent headlines remind us, for example, that
malicious actors can easily render tens of thousands of computers
inoperable, as was done to Saudi Aramco in August of this year; that
distributed denial of service attacks can significantly degrade web
services, as was done to several major U.S. banks last month; and that
hackers can penetrate the networks of companies operating naturalgas pipelines.
The statistics on cybercrime, data breaches, and loss of personal
information are sobering. This year the global cost of cybercrime has
been estimated at $110 billion.2 Between ninety-five and ninety-eight
percent of records lost through data breaches contain personal
information-that is, data such as names, addresses, e-mails, or social
security numbers.' In fiscal year 2011, the Secret Service prevented
$1.6 billion in potential losses through its cybercrime investigations.
And just last year, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team, which is DHS's 24-hour cyber-watch and warning center,
responded to more than 106,000 incident reports and released more
than 5000 actionable cybersecurity alerts and information products to
our public and private sector partners. In short, the threats to our
cybersecurity are real, they are serious, and they are urgent.
The good news is that over the past four years DHS has taken
significant steps to vastly improve the security of federal government
information systems, enhance cybersecurity for the private sector and
non-federal government entities, and promote cybersecurity
nationwide, while at the same time recognizing the unique privacy
concerns that exist within the cyber sphere. DHS continues to seek
improvements in the ways that government is postured to address
these issues, most notably through this Administration's cybersecurity
legislative proposal. Although that effort failed in the Senate last
August, the federal government will continue to identify the ways that
the nation-through its laws, values, and institutions-can improve
our cyber awareness, readiness, and capabilities.
Indeed, today's symposium occurs at a particularly fitting time, for
this is the final week of National Cyber Security Awareness Month,
the overarching theme of which this year is "Achieving Cybersecurity
2. SYMANmEC, 2012 NORTON CYBERRIME REPORT 6 (2012), available at http://nowstatic.norton.com/now/en/pu/images/Promotions/201 2/cybercrimeReport/2012_Nor
tonCybercrimeReportMasterFINAL_050912.pdf.
3. VERIZON, 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONs REPORT 42 (2012), available at
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp-data-breach-investigationsreport-2012-ebken_xg.pdf
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The focus for this week is "Digital Literacy and
Together."
Education," a perfect topic to bring to this audience. In keeping with
these themes, what follows are several steps that can be taken in the
coming months and years to adequately prepare for what lies ahead
in this vital and dynamic field.

It is an axiom of modern life to say that today's technological
landscape is changing rapidly. These changes create significant
challenges for attorneys, educators, and clients. For example, legal
practitioners and clients must understand a range of evolving issues
just to conduct day-to-day business-e-filing, e-discovery, and
preserving privilege in the digital age are issues that are new in the
last twenty years. Although the need for every law student to
demonstrate expertise in both law and technology with respect to
cyber issues may not yet be essential, it is approaching that point for
attorneys who want to practice in government cybersecurity fields. At
DHS, the goal is for attorneys to demonstrate not only expert legal
skills, but also technological literacy and a desire to develop expertise
in the operational fields they serve, to enable them to evaluate and
make more sophisticated legal and policy recommendations.
Government, private sector, and academic communities should
understand that we share a range of interests in promoting the sound
practice of law in support of national cybersecurity programs. And
given the evolving nature of our highly networked, digital world, we
should take time to jointly and collaboratively anticipate what the
future holds so we can plan for our needs accordingly.
Over a century ago, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis took such
an approach in their seminal article, "The Right to Privacy," arguing
that advances in technology and changes in business practices
necessitated a common law right to privacy. Citing the indecency and
impropriety of the press and the trade in gossip they said:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world,
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become
more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise
and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
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him to mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted
4
by mere bodily injury.
It is no less true today than in 1890 that "modern enterprise and
invention"' can create a range of personal harms that should have
remedies under the law if it is to provide a path to justice and a basis
for a stable, prosperous, and peaceful society. Unlike the rate of
change of technology, which can be exponential, changes in the law
tend to be reactive, incremental, and almost always lagging.6 What
we-government and legal communities-should learn from Warren
and Brandeis is their critical assessment of the state of the law and
society, their creativity in proposing a solution to serve the law and
society, and their courage to promote new ideas. Although we are
still in the relatively early days of the virtual world, our society is
already profoundly dependent on the cyber realm, so much so that
we must thoughtfully examine government roles in securing and
developing that realm as a function of a sovereign's duties.
This symposium presents a good opportunity to highlight two main
drivers for a strong government role in cybersecurity. And borrowing
a term from the research and development community, we propose
that government must seek "leap ahead" approaches to privacy in
these endeavors to preserve the essence of individual liberty.
**

*

Our first observation is that government necessarily has a role to
play in cybersecurity, if only because governments must now be
prepared to perform nearly all of their functions in cyberspace. For
the Internal Revenue Service, for example, this means providing tax
information and services online. For the Defense Department, this
means not only maintaining their cyber networks as a function of
force readiness, but also planning for the possibility that cyber
networks and their supporting infrastructure will be used as part of
military action. For DHS, this means understanding and addressing
the cyber dimensions of the Department's five missions: preventing
terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our
borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, ensuring

4. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890).
5. Id. at 196.
6. See generally Ivan K. Fong, Law and New Technology: The Virtues of Muddling
Through, 19 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 443, 454-61 (2001) (book review).
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resilience to disasters, and, of course, safeguarding and securing
cyberspace.
To achieve these missions, DHS must know and understand how
terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, intellectual property thieves, and
other cybercriminals use cyberspace to cause harm or engage in
wrongdoing. And the Department must harness the capabilities and
opportunities of cyberspace to communicate with and serve those
affected by disasters. DHS does not, of course, and cannot do these
things alone. It can achieve its missions only in collaboration with
the homeland security enteprise--thatis, together with federal, state,
local, tribal, and territorial governments; with the academic
community; with international entities; and with the private sector.
These relationships are particularly vital to the Department's efforts
to secure critical infrastructure and information systems. Indeed,
DHS is uniquely positioned to work across the homeland security
enterprise to analyze and mitigate cyberthreats and vulnerabilities;
distribute threat warnings; provide solutions to key research and
development needs; and coordinate the vulnerability, mitigation, and
consequence-management response to cyber incidents. As a result of
these efforts, DHS has become the federal government's focal point
for ensuring that our computers, networks, and information systems
are and remain safe for commerce, for communication, and for our
national security.
In carrying out these core responsibilities, it is worth noting that
DHS puts a special emphasis on protecting privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties. The Department, for example, conducts privacy impact
assessments of cybersecurity programs, trains employees on privacy
and civil liberties, and consults privacy experts as cyber programs are
developed. Among these experts is the DHS chief privacy officer,
who has independent audit authority for DHS programs and works
closely with DHS officials to develop sound programs. Congress
should rightly be credited for this leap-ahead approach to privacy,
because the position was the first of its kind established by statute in
the executive branch.7
DHS also aspires to a leap-ahead approach to privacy through
professional development programs. DHS administers the National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, through which the federal
7.
State of Federal Privacy and Data Security Law: Lagging Behind the Times?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, Subcomm. on
Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (testimony of Mary Ellen Callahan,
Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Sec.), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 12shrg76066/pdf/CHRG-1 12shrg76066.pdf.
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government strives to attract, train, and retain a skilled cyber
workforce. This training and development effort is increasingly
important, particularly given that the size of the Department's
cybersecurity workforce increased seven-fold during the last three
years. And just two weeks ago, the Department began to implement a
slate of eleven recommendations from its Homeland Security
Advisory Council that are aimed at further improving the
Department's cyber skills and relationships with academic and
This comprehensive approach to
professional communities.
workforce development can deliver a leap-ahead approach to privacy
in cybersecurity by including a best-in-class program to instill privacy
principles in all of our cyber professionals. It is as true for privacy as
for security that it is better to build it in than to bolt it on.
DHS also uses technology to take a leap-ahead approach to privacy.
The Analytic Framework for Intelligence, or AFI, is a new and very
important border security system that conducts federated query
searches across the Department's multiple information systems to
identify people and cargo at border crossings or ports that pose
security risks to the nation, while eliminating the need to focus on
those that pose no danger. Logical access controls limit an analyst's
access to data linked to his or her authorized job. And records are
retrieved directly from a source system, precluding the need for
multiple copies of databases. These are not only good privacy
practices, but good security practices, because they help us produce
As with the
more accurate intelligence products quickly.
Department's approach to employee development, AFI shows how to
achieve greater privacy by design.

Our second observation is that government entities have a
responsibility to be alert to and address a range of macroscopic forces
shaping the nation and the cyber environment. Trends in the
economy, technological developments, and security capabilities all
factor into the issue of whether the government should intervene,
and if so, how to do so in an effective and efficient way. The current
and evolving cyberthreat landscape suggests that reliance on the
market alone to meet cybersecurity and privacy needs has not and
will not be sufficient to achieve the goal of a secure and privacy-
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protective cyber environment.'
Any argument that the collective
responsibility of the market obviates the need for government
guidance is belied by recent events. One reason is that cybersecurity
is not yet scalable-that is, in many industries, for companies that
provide critical services, the cost of implementing government- and
industry-recommended best practices, such as the upgrading of
cybersecurity systems, still outweighs any perceived risk-reduction
benefits.
In addition, cyberthreats impose externalities. That is, they impose
risks and harms beyond the individual entities that are directly
affected. Malware on one company's network, for example, can
cascade to the entire sector or the economy at large. Given the
significant public and private interests at stake, the public and private
sectors must therefore work together to develop industry-led,
minimum baseline cybersecurity standards. As John Brennan, the
President's homeland security and counterterrorism advisor, has
noted:
For decades, industry and government have worked together to
protect the physical security of critical assets that reside in private
hands, from airports and seaports to national broadcast systems
and nuclear power plants. There is no reason we cannot also
cooperate to protect the cyber systems of critical infrastructure on
which our economic well-being, national security, and daily lives
depend.'
The law itself-including statutes, regulations, and court
decisions-serves as another macroscopic force in this area. Under
current law, Congress gave DHS significant cyber authorities, and DHS
inherited a patchwork of others. Although the law often changes
subtly over time through regulatory programs or application of the
common law, it can also change more significantly, when necessary,
8. See generally, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE
FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY: A REPORT OF THE CSIS COMMISSION ON CYBERSECUR11Y FOR
THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 49-59 (2008), availableat http://csis.org/files/nedia/csis/pubs/

081208_securingcyherspace_44.pdf;
ASSURING

A

TRUSTED

AND

THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW:

RESILIENT

INFORMATION

AND

COMMUNICATIONS

INFRASTRUCTURE (2009), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/docunents/
CyberspacePolicyReview final.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO
SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003), availableat http://www.us-cert.gov/readijng_r-oom/cyber
space strategy.pdf.
9. Letter from John Brennan, Asst. to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, to Chairman Jay Rockefeller, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and

Transp. (Sept. 12, 2012), availableat http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve
&Fileid=f4da041-6flb3-4f2b-b3d5-0ffd6767ec8db.
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to address critical needs through legislation. Over the past several
years, successive administrations have reported to the public and
Congress that the current legal framework for the nation to advance
necessary cybersecurity programs is significantly strained and
increasingly outdated. Statutes applicable in this field include the
Communications Act,'" which dates to the era of Warren and
Brandeis; the National Security Act of 1947;" the Privacy Act; 2 and
more recent statues like the Federal Information Security
Management Act,"3 the Homeland Security Act, 4 and the Cyber
Security Enhancement Act, 5 all of 2002. Each of these emerged
from discrete sets of interests in regulatory, military, information
security, law enforcement, or counterterrorism siloes that do not
adequately address the cross-cutting nature of the issues or the
nation's current, urgent cybersecurity needs.
In short, we have reached a point where current threats and the
need for strategic approaches to the nation's cyber interests render
our existing amalgam of laws inadequate. The Administration's
recent cybersecurity legislative proposal offered a detailed roadmap
for Congress to begin to take a more comprehensive approach to
these issues. It would have provided for the establishment of baseline
cybersecurity practices for the nation's critical core infrastructure.
Unfortunately, Congress's inability to act decisively and with foresight
in this area may prove to be the most significant government obstacle
to improving the state of the nation's cybersecurity.

As the Administration looks for additional opportunities to
advance a legislative solution in this important area, it obviously also
keeps a watchful eye on trends emerging in case law that affect its
ability to achieve its missions. Cases related to border security
counterterrorism programs, for example, and the use of electronic
devices for administrative and law enforcement purposes, guide
government officials both in using cyber capabilities to perform
government functions and preserving our interests in privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties.
10. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934),
amended
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
11. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
13. Pub. L. No. 107-347, Title III, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946 (2002).
14. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
15. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135, 2156 (2002).

by

the
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The Supreme Court's decision earlier this year in United States v.
Jonesl6 stands as a prime example. In Jones, the Court held that the
government's warrantless use of a global positioning device to track
the public movements of a criminal suspect, over a four-week period,
was an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Although Justice Scalia's majority opinion relied on a
common law theory of trespass to find a Fourth Amendment
violation, Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion serves as a
harbinger of future privacy considerations in this area. She noted
that a physical intrusion is now unnecessary for many forms of
surveillance and that even cases involving short-term monitoring will
require particular attention with respect to application of the
As a result of new
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard. 7
technology, she noted, "people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.""8
Do people reasonably expect that the government might, without a
warrant, track their movements in a manner that would allow their
political and religious beliefs and their personal behaviors to be
ascertained? Does the answer change if such collection is done in the
virtual world of cyber infrastncture rather than the physical world of
Jeeps and public roads? How long should law enforcement entities
be permitted to retain and search such data for law enforcement
purposes? Can they share such data with other government entities,
or use such data when obtained by other government entities for
non-law enforcement purposes? There are no bright-line answers to
these questions. But these are the kinds of questions the Supreme
Court is asking and that those in law enforcement, in government
generally, and you in the academic community need to help answer.
The Jones case illustrates the growing tension-indeed collision is
not too strong a word-between settled legal doctrines and advances
in technology.' 9 Just as Brandeis and Warren noted in 1890, "modern
enterprise and invention" can subject an individual to far greater
"mental pain and distress" than can be "inflicted by mere bodily
injury."2 In particular, the line between what is public and what is
private is no longer a clear one. Rather, with modern technology,
16. 132 S. Ct. 954 (2012).
17. Id. at 955-56.
18. Id. at 957.
19. See, e.g., Fong, supra note 6, at 456 (noting areas where "modern-day courts
and lawyers are similarly struggling to fit new technologies into existing legal
conceptual rules and categories").
20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 196.
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what used to be considered a binary distinction under the law-in
which what is not private is, by definition, public-must now be
reconsidered in light of how people today actually share information
about themselves.
Courts have long held that individuals have no expectation of
privacy over information voluntarily disclosed to third-parties. 2'
Under this third-party doctrine, details such as your location on
public streets, which you share with those who see you, and the
websites you visit, which you share with your Internet service
provider, are by default public. That means that you do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy over such information, and
accordingly law enforcement may be permitted to obtain that
information about you without a warrant. When people share
information today, however, they often contemplate sharing
information only with certain categories of people. They may use
privacy control settings, for example, that allow information to be
disseminated more broadly to family and close friends and less
broadly to others, if at all. In these and other similar situations, users
do not intend for all information to be "public" in the traditional
sense. Instead, "controlled disclosure" is a more accurate way to
think about how people share information in cyberspace today, and
the law must therefore adapt to that reality.
To the extent the third-party doctrine rests on assumptions about
how information is shared today that are no longer valid, the
doctrine of practical obscurity likewise rests on increasingly tenuous
assumptions. Over twenty years ago, in United States Department of
"
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,22
the Reporter's
Committee sought access under the Freedom of Information Act to
an individual's "rap sheet" maintained by the FBI, arguing that it
should be disclosed because, among other reasons, it contained
information publicly available at the relevant courthouses."
Ruling
for the government, however, the Supreme Court held that the rap
sheet was properly withheld tinder an exception to the Freedom of
Information Act; even though some information it contained might
technically be considered public, there is a high privacy interest in
maintaining the practical obscurity of personal information in the
2
rap sheet.

21.
Miller,
22.
23.
24.

See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v.
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 780.
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Technology has, of course, rendered this privacy-protective aspect
of practical obscurity increasingly tenuous. The ability to aggregate
and instantaneously search for previously obscure data erodes any
assurance that information available only to a select few will not now
be subjected to broad dissemination. A notable recent example is the
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge ("STOCK") Act, signed
into law in April of this year.2" In addition to restricting Congress
from engaging in certain financial transactions, the new law also
requires certain financial disclosure statements submitted by senior
federal officials to be posted online in a searchable database for
public viewing. Before the STOCK Act, these financial disclosures
were available in paper form upon request, making them public in a
It would have been difficult and impractical,
technical sense.
however, to aggregate and disseminate broadly the sensitive
information they contained. In recognition of the new reality, a
district court recendy delayed the implementation of the Internet
posting requirement of the STOCK Act and ordered further briefing
on whether this portion of the new law violates these officials' privacy
rights in a way that the earlier filing requirement did not.26
Mindful of ways that traditional legal theories and standards are
now being applied to new technologies, we are all engaged in
defining privacy as a societal value and shaping the way that privacy
serves as a touchstone for the development and delivery of sound
public programs. We should proactively and responsibly raise
questions about the application of such legal principles to situations
unimagined when those principles were first articulated. And we
should examine our own personal values and be prepared to
articulate them as part of the national dialogue.

The current generation of law students in particular is uniquely
placed to help shape the future of cyber law. To prepare yourself for
a future working on cybersecurity legal issues, you must first
understand the law as it applies outside the cyber realm. As we survey
new legal ground in cyberspace, we are constantly drawing upon
analogies from other areas-privacy, search and seizure, intellectual
property, and other areas. You should also learn the value of working
in teams, and how to work constructively with others, for virtually
25.
26.

Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
Senior Exec. Ass'n v. United States, 891 F.Supp.2d 745, 755-56 (D. Md. 2012).
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everything lawyers do is through collaboration with others. And you
should model your scope of vision, clarity of argument, and breadth
of purpose on the likes of Warren and Brandeis. If you endeavor to
serve narrow scopes and interests, you may benefit small pockets of
the legal and cyber communities, but you will miss the opportunity to
address the broader challenges at stake in a highly networked world.
We need the best and the brightest minds to handle the evolving
nature of the threats facing the country. Few professional callings are
greater than being a government lawyer, serving the public interest.
Look to the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies
performing cybersecurity functions to develop your professional
skills. Honors programs, internships, and externships in government
will give you unrivaled perspective in the cyber field as it develops.
More important, being a government lawyer allows you to be part of
something bigger than yourself-it is a true public service. It is an
opportunity to protect and advance the rule of law, which is vitally
important in homeland security and national security contexts. And
you are likely to get responsibility, challenges, and opportunities
earlier in your career than in other professional settings.
**

*

In closing, keep in mind two points. First, changes in technology
require changes in the law and thus leadership from lawyers. In this
area, government lawyers must "leap ahead" with a keen
understanding of what the nation requires of its public institutions.
They must then help lead their agencies and other communities to
the changes that are necessary. Academic, private sector, and
government communities share these responsibilities and interests, so
they should strive to remain aware of the trends emerging in each.
We need smart, creative lawyers who understand how to accomplish
our mission while protecting civil rights and civil liberties, privacy,
and the core values that define this country.
For example, when might a distributed denial of service attack
constitute an armed attack or conflict under the law of war?27 Under
27. See, e.g., Remarks of Harold Koh, State Dep't Legal Adviser, to the the U.S.
Cyber Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference, (September 18, 2012), available at
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/
?utmsource=rss&utm medium=rss&utmcampaign=harold-koh-on-international-law
-in-cyberspace (asserting that "the jus in bello principle of distinction applies to
computer network attacks undertaken in the context of an armed conflict" and that
"States should undertake a legal review of weapons, including those that employ a
cyber capability.").
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what conditions would such an attack trigger a nation-state's right of
self-defense? 2s And what are the limits of such responses? To what
extent may online content be restricted if it offends or incites
violence half-way around the world? What are the limits of
"hacktivism"? 21 To what extent may the government rely on its
authorities at the border to prevent, limit, or control cyberthreats
originating outside the country? 30 And what is the future of Internet
governance? Your critical assessment, creativity, and courage to
tackle these and other fundamental issues can make you, for these
topics, the Warren and Brandeis of the future.
Second, government employment in these areas is an important
public service.
Our nation has come together to meet great
challenges before. During World War II, when our economy was
mobilized for war, the American people found a way to feed
themselves by growing forty percent of all the vegetables we needed
in twenty million victory gardens. In the early years of the Cold War,
Americans knew where the closest fallout shelter was, and we kept
children indoors when polio outbreaks were the biggest threat to
public health. In those times, Americans understood what was at
stake; they understood that they had to contribute; and they knew
that their efforts would make a difference, in ways large and small.
We are likewise confronting new realities here, and we need new
thinking and new energy. The world is a different place that it was
fifteen years ago, before 9/11, and even ten years ago, just after 9/11.
You can contribute to those aims by joining the Department and
other parts of the homeland security enterprise. Doing so is urgent;
doing so is worthwhile; and doing so will undoubtedly impact our
nation's economic vitality and way of life for generations. Together,
we can-and we must-maintain a cyberspace that is safe and
resilient and that remains a source of tremendous opportunity and
growth for years and years to come. It is encouraging to see such
enthusiasm for these issues in the academic and professional
communities; we must draw on your tremendous creativity, energy,
and optimism to do something unlike what the nation has ever done
28. See, e.g., Remarks of Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Def., to the Business Executives for
National Security, (October 11, 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136 (stating that "[i]f a crippling cyber attack were
launched against our nation ... [a] nd if the Commander in Chief orders a response,
the Defense Department must be ready to obey that order and to act").
29. See Melinda Haag, Prosecution of Internet Hacktivist Group "Anonymous," U.S.
DEP'T OFJUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing-room/cc/mca-anonymous.html
(last visited June 15, 2013) (recounting several investigations and prosecutions
involving hacktivists).
30. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2013).
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before. These are complex and long-term challenges. That should
not, however, be a reason for despair. It should instead motivate us
to work and think and collaborate in new ways. As Albert Einstein
once said, "It's not that I'm so smart. It's just that I stay with
problems longer." That hints at the determination we must bring to
one of today's hardest challenges.
Thank you again for this opportunity to contribute to your
symposium.

